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THE PROCESS OF BECOMING SUSPICIOUS OF
ULTERIOR MOTIVES
Miquelle A. G. Marchand and Roos Vonk
Radboud University Nijmegen
We examined the process of becoming suspicious and discovering ulterior
motives. Participants read about a likable behavior, then sequentially re-
ceived ten cues about potential ulterior motives of the actor. Participants
were asked to think aloud while they were reading. Their thoughts were
coded. We expected that the general impression of the actor would gradu-
ally become more negative, whereas suspicion would first increase and
later decrease, concomitant with increased certainty that ulterior motives
were indeed involved. Confirming our hypotheses, we found a linear effect
for general impression and a quadratic effect for suspicion. Discussion fo-
cuses on the development of suspicion as a process and on the relevance of
our findings to other settings in which multiple hypotheses are entertained.
There is ample evidence that most people cannot distinguish hon-
est from deceptive behavior of others (Anderson, DePaulo,
Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999; DePaulo & Friedman, 1998;
Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Malone & DePaulo, 2001). One of the
reasons why people are so poor at detecting deception is a perva-
sive truthfulness bias: People tend to accept everything they see at
face value. Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone (1993) proposed that
people cannot comprehend something without accepting it as
true (cf. Gilbert, 1991). People do have the power to assent, reject,
and to suspend their judgment, but only after they have initially
believed the information to which they have been exposed.
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Gilbert et al. (1993) provided evidence that “ . . . belief is first, easy,
and inexorable and that doubt is retroactive, difficult, and only
occasionally successful” (p. 231). As a consequence, most people
tend to judge others as truthful most of the time (O’Sullivan,
Ekman, & Friesen, 1988; Zuckerman, Fischer, Osmun, & Winkler,
1987; Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984).
Related research on attribution suggests that a disposition is of-
ten directly inferred from behavior, whereas the role of other vari-
ables (such as the situation) is underestimated or ignored by
perceivers (known as the correspondence bias or fundamental at-
tribution error; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). This
very robust phenomenon, again, reflects the tendency to take be-
havior at face value. More recent research by O’Sullivan (2003) sug-
gests that the fundamental attribution error significantly
undermines the ability to detect honesty and deception accurately.
She found evidence that when observers thought positively about
someone, they also tended to believe the other person was telling
the truth even when the person was lying. Overcoming this robust
effect appears to be difficult both in attribution research and decep-
tion detection: “The tendency to judge other people on the basis of
enduring traits, rather than situational relevant states, is one of the
reasons most lie catchers are so inaccurate, and adjusting this
cognitive heuristic is not easy” (O’Sullivan, 2003; p. 1325).
There is one particular circumstance in which the truthfulness
bias can be overcome, namely, when a perceiver becomes suspi-
cious about a person’s motives (Fein, 1996). For example, imagine
that you are reading about John who takes a colleague with car
trouble to the garage. Probably you think of John as a nice, helpful
man. However, when you learn that the colleague is an attractive
woman, that John is not very helpful in other situations, and that
he has no serious relationship at the moment, you might start
wondering whether John took her to the garage merely because
he was interested in her romantically. In this case, ambiguity
emerges about the actor’s motives; the perceiver does not know
whether the behavior should be ascribed to a correspondent trait
(helpful) or to an ulterior motive (romantically interested).
Fein (1996) describes suspicion as a state in which perceivers
hold multiple, rival hypotheses about the motives or sincerity of
the actor’s behavior. According to Hilton, Fein, and Miller (1993),
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perceivers in this state suspend their judgment about the actor
until they have more information about the actor’s motives. If
they have to give a judgment, their evaluation will be neutral.
This was also found in a study conducted by Vonk (1999a), in
which likable behaviors enacted toward superiors were judged
more moderately than toward subordinates, indicating that sub-
jects took into account the possibility of ulterior motives (i.e.,
“brownnosing”). Further, it seems that suspicious perceivers
think actively and systematically about why the actor behaved as
he or she did. This is what Fein (1996) calls the attributional
mindset. Concomitant with this thoughtfulness and moderate
judgments, the correspondence bias is reduced, because looking
beyond face value requires an analytical state of mind.
In Fein and his colleagues’ studies, suspicion of ulterior motives
is experimentally induced. Participants receive a description of a
situation that puts them in a state of suspicion. Subsequently, ad-
ditional information is provided that can change participants’
judgments in one direction or the other. For example, Fein,
Hilton, and Miller (1990) had participants read a story about a
man who courts a wealthy widow. Participants were unwilling to
conclude either that he was in love with her or that he was after
her money; they were not certain which inference to make (i.e.,
they were suspicious). Then they read additional information
about the man’s visit to a grocery store, where the clerk gave him
too much change. In one condition, the man returned the extra
money, while in the other condition he kept the extra change. Par-
ticipants who read that the suitor returned the money concluded
that he truly loved the woman, while the other participants con-
cluded that he was motivated by greed. It is important to note that
in our view, at this point participants cannot be regarded as suspi-
cious anymore: They no longer question whether the actor is
insincere; they know.1
Although it is evident that suspicion about ulterior motives can
overcome the correspondence bias, it is not clear how the process
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1. According to the definition, suspicion has ended when a perceiver does not hold mul-
tiple hypotheses anymore, and is confident that the actor was driven by ulterior motives.
At this point, the actor is no longer a “suspect”, but is “guilty”. This does not mean that hav-
ing been suspicious may not produce subsequent residual effects. We will return to this is-
sue in the Discussion.
of suspicion evolves. In the studies by Fein and colleagues, partic-
ipants are either in a state of suspicion (upon reading a story
about an actor who behaves suspiciously) or out of that state
(upon receiving subsequent information that corroborates one of
the two possible inferences). Presumably, however, perceivers of-
ten do not instantly become suspicious, nor do they instantly
abandon suspicion when they receive disambiguating informa-
tion (unless it is extremely diagnostic). In the present study, we
sought to extend the research by Fein et al. by examining the en-
tire process, from the moment that perceivers have no suspicion
at all, through a phase in which suspicion emerges, to the moment
that they become certain that the actor indeed has an ulterior mo-
tive. We hypothesized that perceivers become suspicious gradu-
ally—as they start questioning a person’s motives—and that they
abandon suspicion gradually, as more information becomes
available that confirms their suspicion.
In order to record this dynamic process, we first presented par-
ticipants with a description of a positive behavior, so they would
have a positive evaluation of the actor (e.g., taking a colleague
with car trouble to the garage). Then participants received small
pieces of additional information (cues) that imply that the actor
might have an ulterior motive (e.g., the colleague is a woman; the
colleague is attractive). We asked participants to think out loud
after each cue (cf. Greenwald, 1968; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), and
we coded their thoughts on two dimensions: evaluation and
suspicion.
Our hypotheses are that participants’ general impressions of
the actor will become increasingly negative as more cues are en-
countered, whereas suspicion will first increase and then de-
crease, as participants become more certain of their judgment and
change their initial evaluations (from positive to negative). In
short, we expect a linear trend for evaluation and a quadratic
trend for suspicion.
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants. Forty–nine students at Radboud University
Nijmegen participated for a fee of €1.00 (at the time, about $1.10).
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Two participants were dismissed, one due to stuttering and one
because he did not think aloud the whole time.
Stimulus Materials. In order to safeguard the generalizability of
the results, we used three different scenarios (presented between
participants), which were pretested among 59 participants. From
the data of this pretest, we also selected ten cues per scenario, which
were all judged to be moderately informative on a seven–point scale.
More extreme informative cues were not selected, because one
highly informative cue could be sufficient to create certainty about
ulterior motives. The first scenario was: John asks Henrietta to marry
him. Examples of cues for this scenario include: “John likes luxuri-
ous products”; “Henrietta is not very interesting”; “Henrietta is a
widow.” The mean for the ten cues in this scenario was M = 3.56 (1 =
not at all informative, 7 = very informative).
The second scenario was: John takes a colleague with car trou-
ble to the garage. Examples of cues for this scenario include: “the
colleague is a woman”; “John does not have a steady relation-
ship”; “John offers his colleague compliments about her work.”
The mean informativeness of the ten cues was M = 3.99.
In the third scenario, the main sentence was: “John responds en-
thusiastically to another person’s idea during the meeting.” Exam-
ples of cues include: “the other person is higher in rank”; “John does
not have tenure”; ”John will soon have an assessment.” The mean
informativeness for the ten cues used in this scenario was M = 3.91.
In addition to the specific actor cues, negative general actor cues
of John were used, for example, “John does not offer his seat to the
pregnant woman on the bus.” This type of behavior descriptions,
in other settings, was also used in studies by Fein et al. (1990).
For each scenario, ten cues were presented. For order variation,
these were divided into three blocks each containing three or four
sentences. Each block contained one cue about the target (e.g., the
other person is higher in rank), one was a negative general actor
cue, and one was a specific actor cue (e.g., “John does not have a
tenure”). Both the order in which the blocks were presented, as
well as the order of the sentences within each block, were ran-
domized. This way, we ensured that no more than two “similar”
sentences (e.g., two general actor cues) were presented sequen-
tially. Also, in the car trouble scenario, the first cue was always
that the colleague was a woman, because some other cues, (e.g.,
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the colleague is attractive) were ambiguous without this informa-
tion. In the meeting scenario, the first two cues were always that
the person with whom John agrees is a man and that the man is
higher in rank. This was done to prevent redundancy with a later
cue, that this man is John’s superior.2
Procedure. Participants sat behind a computer in a cubicle. The
experimenter sat near them. She told participants that they would
participate in a study in which they had to think aloud, and that
their thoughts would be recorded with a tape recorder. The par-
ticipants then read an instruction on the computer screen, in
which it was explained that they had to form an impression of
John and that they had to express their thoughts aloud. They were
asked to click “ok” in order to receive the scenario sentence (for
example, “John asks Henrietta to marry him”), which had to be
read aloud immediately, after which they started thinking aloud.
In the same way, participants clicked “ok” for every next cue,
read it aloud, and expressed their thoughts.
Thoughts after each cue were rated for evaluation of the actor
(ranging from –2 = negative to +2 = positive) and for how suspi-
cious the participant was. A suspicion score of 3 was given for
maximum suspicion (i.e., at least two possible motives for the be-
havior were considered and the participant could not decide be-
tween these two). A score of 2 was given when the participant did
consider two explanations for the behavior, but leaned toward
one of the two and thought the other less likely. A score of 1 was
given when the participant was certain either that the actor was
nice/friendly or that he had an ulterior motive. Two judges coded
the thinking aloud protocols independently of each other for half
of the participants. The thoughts were coded in their original or-
der, because in some cases participants said that a piece of extra
information did not change their views; in that case the thought
was rated identical to the previous thought. The correlations be-
tween the scores of both judges were r = .81 for evaluation and r =
.79 for suspicion.
The judges also coded at which particular cue a participant
started doubting the actor’s motives (r = .87) and at which cue the
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2. The exact randomization scheme is available upon request.
participant concluded for certain that the actor had an ulterior
motive (r = .84).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A MANOVA with cue (0–10) as within–subjects factor and sce-
nario as between–subjects factor showed that, with regard to eval-
uation, the expected linear trend emerged, F(1, 44) = 147.31, p < .01.
Regardless of scenario (interaction F(2, 44) = 1.35, ns), the actor was
judged less positively when more cues were presented. The means
are shown in Figure 1. There was also a significant quadratic trend
for this variable, F(1, 44) = 91.21, p < .01. This is due to the fact that
the evaluation first declines rapidly, but later levels off, which re-
sults in a deviation from the perfect linear pattern.
With regard to suspicion, we found the expected quadratic trend,
F(1, 44) = 14.14, p < .01. The linear trend was not significant F(1, 44)
= 1.95, ns. The means in Figure 2 indicate that initially, after reading
the scenario sentence, the participants were certain of their judg-
ments of the actor, then quickly started doubting those judgments;
gradually they tended to become less suspicious, until at the end
they were certain about the motives again. As the figure also indi-
cates, there is an interaction effect with scenario F(2, 44) = 12.80, p <
.01. It appears that there was no suspicion in the marriage proposal
scenario. More detailed examination of the thinking aloud proto-
cols in this condition suggests that the process often developed so
quickly that it could not be coded. For example, at the cue that
Henrietta is a widow, one participant immediately said: “Oh,
widow, I think she is a rich woman. John himself has a low income
evidently.” The maximum suspicion score of 3 was never reached
here, because the participant immediately changed from a positive
to a negative image of the actor.
With regard to the question at which cue suspicion arises, no
clear pattern was found for the marriage proposal scenario. Many
participants (9 out of 12), however, became suspicious at the cues
“Henrietta is not very interesting” (four participants) or
“Henrietta is not very attractive” (five participants). This means
that suspicion emerged at varying order positions, because the
order of cues was varied. When participants first read that
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Henrietta is not very attractive they expect that John wants to
marry her because of her inner qualities. When they learn subse-
quently that she is not very interesting, they are certain that there
has to be an ulterior motive. Conversely, when she is dull,
participants assume she is attractive.
In the car trouble scenario most participants (12 out of 13) be-
came suspicious at the first cue (the colleague is a woman). In the
meeting scenario, 17 out of 21 participants became suspicious at
the second cue (the person with whom John agrees is higher in
rank). This implies that the rapid increase in suspicion in these
scenarios might be caused by the fact that they always started
with fixed cues that happened to evoke suspicion in most of the
participants (see Figure 2). In order to examine this possibility we
conducted the second study.
STUDY 2
METHOD
In this study we replicated the meeting scenario (John responds
enthusiastically to another person’s idea during the meeting), but
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FIGURE 1. Evaluation for each scenario at cue 0-10 (-2 = negative +2 = positive) in Study 1.
presented all cues in random order. The cue “the person with
whom John agrees is his superior” was removed and the cue “the
other person is higher in rank” was not presented at a fixed loca-
tion. In other respects, the method used was the same as in Study
1. Thirteen participants from Radboud University Nijmegen par-
ticipated for a fee of €1.00.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The data were coded by the same independent judges.3 The re-
sults again indicated a linear trend for evaluation, F(1, 12) = 41.15,
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3. In addition, we asked two student coders, who were uninformed about our hypothe-
ses, to rate both evaluation and level of suspicion for the thinking aloud data from Studies 1
and 2. The coders showed acceptable agreement (all rs > .60, ps < .01). For the first three sce-
narios from Study 1, the analyses of the data produced by these judges showed the same
patterns: a linear trend for evaluation F(1, 32) = 79.64, p < .01 and a quadratic trend for sus-
picion F(1, 32) = 5.51, p = .03. For the random meeting scenario from Study 2, the results also
replicate the patterns found earlier: a linear trend for evaluation F(1, 12) = 21.63, p < .01 and
a quadratic trend for suspicion F(1, 12) = 6.48, p < .03.
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FIGURE 2. Degree of suspicion for each scenario at cue 0-10 (1 = certainty, 3 = suspicion) in Study 1.
p < .01. Also, a quadratic trend for suspicion emerged, F(1, 12) =
5.97, p < .03, whereas the linear trend was not significant, F(1, 12) =
1.65, ns. As can be seen in Figure 3, the increase of suspicion in this
study is weaker and more gradual. Thus, the quick increase in the
first study was probably caused by the fact that a relatively infor-
mative cue, that the other person is higher in rank (M = 4.75, in
pretest, as compared to M = 3.82 for other cues), was the second
cue for every participant. Presumably, the same applies to the car
trouble scenario and the cue that the other person is a woman.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Extant research suggests that people are not good at detecting in-
sincerity, due to the correspondence bias and a more general
truthfulness bias (O’Sullivan, 2003). A suspicious mindset is a
quite effective antidote to these biases (Fein, 1996). The present re-
search uniquely showed how this mindset emerges and pro-
gresses as more information is received. In addition, each study
showed that people can be quite ready to suspect ulterior mo-
tives. Participants read one of three different scenario descrip-
tions of an actor who behaved in a positive way, to induce an
initially favorable correspondent inference. Then they received
additional, moderately informative cues that evoked suspicion
by casting a negative light on the behavior. As predicted, think-
ing–aloud protocols showed the expected linear effect for evalua-
tion of the actor. That is, participants evaluated the actor less
positively as more information was presented. In addition, they
also showed the expected quadratic effect for suspicion.
Perceivers who were initially certain of their evaluation soon be-
gan to doubt the actor’s motives (suspicion). As more information
was presented, they became progressively more certain that the
actor indeed had ulterior motives, until finally they were certain.
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that suspicion is a dy-
namic process that unfolds over time as people grapple with the
possibility that an actor has ulterior motives, and then become
convinced. As more information is processed, the negative
opinion of the actor increases, while uncertainty rises and then
falls.
Further, our findings suggest that participants can detect ulte-
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rior motives or insincerity quite quickly, even though they were
presented with cues that were moderate in informativeness. The
results also indicate that certain cues effectively trigger suspicion.
Mainly, these cues involve characteristics of the person toward
whom the behavior is enacted (i.e., target cues or actor–target re-
lationship cues), such as “the other person is a woman,” “the
other person is higher in rank,” and “the other person is not at-
tractive.” In line with Vonk’s (1999a) studies, in which partici-
pants evaluated an actor’s positive behavior differentially
depending on the target’s hierarchical position, the largest
changes in suspicion and evaluation emerged on the basis of tar-
get information. By comparison, the general actor cues used by
Fein et al. (1990) had a minor effect on suspicion in our studies. In
only four out of 120 instances, general actor cues led to suspicion
or to certainty that the actor had an ulterior motive. The difference
between our actor cues and those used by Fein et al. is that ours
were only informative on a general evaluative dimension and
were unrelated to the behavior (e.g., in the wealthy widow sce-
nario, offering a seat to a pregnant woman only means that the ac-
tor is friendly; it is not related to honesty or greed). It is possible
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FIGURE 3. Degree of suspicion for the random meeting scenario at cue 0-9 (1 = certainty, 3 = sus-
picion) in Study 2.
that the actor cues in Fein’s studies were more disambiguating be-
cause they were descriptively related to honesty or to the trait di-
mension under consideration (e.g., in the wealthy widow
scenario, returning extra change to a clerk is related to honesty as
well as greed, so this cue helped participants conclude that the
actor was in love with the widow).
In general, cues that are specifically related to the characteristic
under consideration probably evoke greater changes in suspi-
cion. In our studies, these were often target cues (e.g., in the
wealthy widow scenario, the woman is not very interesting).
Note that the influential role of target information is at odds with
the correspondence bias and the tendency to focus on the actor
and ignore the behavioral field. It is, however, in accord with re-
cent evidence (Ham & Vonk, in preparation) that characteristics
of the targets of behavior are automatically included in spontane-
ous trait inferences (e.g., helping a colleague activates different
traits than helping a superior).
In our studies, the informativeness of the cues presented was
held constant. In real life, cues are probably more differentiated in
their level of informativeness. Moreover, the cues would not be
observed in such a short amount of time. In everyday life, people
learn a few things when they meet a person and they learn some-
thing new on a different occasion. Although the basic mecha-
nisms should be the same, the process of becoming suspicious
and then certain may take more time outside of the lab. Also, in
real life, people not only receive negative information about oth-
ers, but also positive information, which might further slow
down the process of suspicion or even reverse it.
In the present studies, the information was presented to partici-
pants. In real life, when people become suspicious about an ac-
tor’s motives, they may themselves start to search for relevant
information that could disambiguate the behavior, although we
have evidence that the information they acquire is not the most
diagnostic (Marchand & Vonk, 2004). Nonetheless, future re-
search should examine a variety of protocols designed to mirror
information gathering under more natural conditions.
In addition, individual differences may affect the speed of the
suspicion process. For example, people who are high in need for
closure (i.e., have a desire to reduce ambiguity [Kruglanski, 1989]
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and tend to be impulsive and form quick judgments of others
[Kruglanski & Webster, 1996]) may tend to think of others as pri-
marily either good or bad. If so, participants with a higher need
for closure may be quicker to jump through the process and con-
clude that an actor is insincere. Of course, they might also be
slower to start doubting people if they prefer to retain their
original, positive evaluation.
If people are certain about their judgment of an actor, they can
no longer be described as suspicious, because they are not enter-
taining multiple, rival hypotheses anymore. At that point, by def-
inition, suspicion is over. Interestingly, Fein (1996) has shown
that when perceivers have been suspicious about an actor’s mo-
tives, they are less likely to fall prey to the correspondence bias
when making subsequent judgments about a novel actor. While
this might suggest that suspicion continues onward, we think this
result can be explained by a priming or accessibility effect. That is,
once a suspicious mindset has been activated, it is more likely to
be triggered again in new situations.
It is important to note that the process of suspicion may apply to
any situation in which a person’s behavior can be guided by mul-
tiple motives, thus causing perceivers to hold multiple hypothe-
ses, or doubt whether their initial judgment was correct. This may
occur, for instance, in persuasion settings (e.g., a salesman claim-
ing that this is the best buy ever, or any persuasive message from a
biased source; cf. Campbell, 1995), deception detection situations
(e.g., a woman who finds lipstick on her husband’s collar),
self–presentational situations (e.g., a person claiming high com-
petence in a job interview; Leary, 1995; Vonk, 1999b), and even the
detection of discrimination, in which case mixed motives are also
involved (e.g., a person may be rejected for a job either because of
sexism or because she is not adequate; Fiske, Bersoff, Bordiga,
Deaux, & Heilman, 1991; Berkvens & Vonk, 2002). Our studies are
a first step toward mapping the challenging and fascinating
process of becoming suspicious, in person perception as well as
other domains.
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